ON VON NEUMANN'S MINIMAX THEOREM
HUKUKANE NlKAIDO 1. Introduction. It was J. von Neumann [ 7] , [8] who first proved the minimax theorem under quite general conditions. A little later, in establishing a generalization of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem, S. Kakutani [3] gave a simple proof of this result.
In the present paper, we shall give an alternative proof of the theorem. We believe the proof to be presented is of interest, in that it enables ύs to derive this theorem, regardless of the dimensionality of strategy spaces, directly from the classical Brouwer's theorem, without any use of further generalizations [l] , [5] of Kakutani's theorem in infinite dimensional linear spaces.
It should also be noticed that the theorem to be proved can not always be derived from such types of generalized fixed point theorems. We shall make a remark concerning this point in § 6.
In this study, the author was greatly aided by many works on this subject, especially by J* Nash's work [6] regarding the use of the fixed-point theorem.
2. Preliminaries. A linear space L over the field of real numbers R is said to be topological, if a Hausdorff topology is given in it such that the mappings
We denote by C(A ) the convex closure of a subset A in L. where λ and μ are arbitrary real numbers.
Statement of the theorem.
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These sets are evidently closed (convex) subsets of X and Y respectively. for any x € X and any y G Y; that is, [*°, y°] is a saddle-point of" K (x, y).
Thus we have only to see that λ 0 = μo For this aim, let 6 be an arbitrary positive number. Then we have
The statement implies the fact that for every x G X there exists some y G Y such that
The statement
implies the fact that for every y G Y there exists some x G X such that
Let us put
Then Uy and F % are open sets in X and Y, respectively. Furthermore, in view of (1) and (2 ), we have
y eγ xex
Then, by virtue of the compactness of X and Y, there exist two systems of finite numbers of points {α; i -1, 2, , s } and { bj / = 1, 2, , t} such that
these relations imply
Then and,
Φi(y) φj(x)
, by definition, by virtue of (3 ) and (4 ),
for any x for any y ex, e y.
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We consider the following mapping:
This mapping is clearly a continuous mapping from -Y x Y into itself.
Denote by A and δ the finite point-sets ί a £ -! and I bj ! respectively. Then
is continuously mapped into itself by the above mapping. Since Now, by the definition of φ (y), we have K (αj s y) > μ for ί such that ^? (y) > 0; hence the quasi-concavity of K(x 9 y) yields
On the other hand, by the definition of φ(x), we have K(x 9 bj) < λ for / such that \!>Xχ) > 0; hence the quasi-convexity of K (x, y) yields
Therefore (7) and (8) imply μ < λ, which means (9) μ Q < λ 0 + 26.
Thus the arbitrariness of e implies μ Q < λo Hence we have, together with the fact previously established, λ 0 = μ Q , which was to be shown.
As a special case of this theorem, we obtain the generalized J. 
5.
Approximating finite strategy spaces. Let X 9 Y 9 and K(x 9 γ) be the same as before* Let further S and T be finite point-sets in X and Y respectively. By virtue of the theorem just proved, the game with the same payoff is determined, even if C(S) and C(T) are employed as strategy spaces. Denote by σ and r the values of the original game and the game mentioned above respectively.
Then C(S) and C(T) will be called £-approximating finite strategy spaces provided | σ -r | <C e.
We shall next establish their existence for any £ > 0. But, to establish this fact, we do not need a new discussion. Indeed, just C (A ) and C(B) in the preceding section serve as £-approximating finite strategy-spaces.
In fact, putting λ 0 = μ Q = σ, we obtain, in view of (3 ) and (4), (10) r = max min K (x, y) < max min K{x 9 y) <^σ + £,
() yec(B) x£X yEC(B)
(11) τ= min max K(x 9 y) > min max K{x 9 y) > σ -£.
ec(B) x£C(A) y£Y x£C(A)
This proves that | σ -τ\ < £; (10) 
Miscellaneous remarks. The implication of the assumption that K(x 9 y)
is continuous in each variable for any fixed value of the other is a little delicate. The Kakutani-type approach to the minimax theorem imposes only a very weak algebraic restriction on K{x 9 y): namely, Φ(x) of (12) as well as Ψ(y) of (13 ) should be convex sets. But it requires a rather strong topological condition; the continuity of the payoff in the variable [x 9 y]. Our minimax theorem sacrifices, on the contrary, the algebraic conditions to a certain degree for the benefit of the weaker topological condition * on payoffs. This implicit result of
In case of bilinear, or convex, games [2, 5, 4] , the topological condition on payoffs can be further weakened. As to the algebraic conditions, it should be noticed that neither Fan's convexity concept [2] nor our quasi-convexity concept includes the other. Since Fan's convexity premises no linear spaces, this quite general concept can not be deduced from ours. On the other hand, one may point out, by means of the following example, that our quasi-convexity is not always implied by Fan's convexity: K (x, y) = -x /i(x -γ) + l] for -1 < x, y < 1. This payoff is not convex in y in Fan's sense. Indeed, there exists no y such that K(x, y) < [ K(x, 1) + K(x,-l) ]/2 for all x. But it is quasi-concave in x and quasi-convex in y. 
If, in our theorem, K{x 9 γ) is continuous with respect to the variable [x, γ] £ X x y, it is easily seen that the point-to-set transformations
are all upper semi-continuous. Thus any fixed point of the transformation,
is a desired saddle-point of K{x 9 y). However, our theorem can not always be obtained by this method, even if the strategy-spaces are embedded in locally convex spaces. We give here a simple example of K{x 9 y) for which the transformations (12), (13) weakly and x n G Ψ (y n ), but x <£ Ψ (y). Let { z n \ be a complete orthonormal system. Next, let us put Xn = λ/"2 y n ; y n = zι/2 + z π + ι/2; Λ; = V2 y, y = z t /2.
Then it is obvious that 11**11 = i» lly Λ II = VV^"» and *»-»*» y n -» y
